

A REVIEW OF ARAC'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE TITAN II MISSILE ACCIDENT

Thomas J. Sullivan

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, University of California
Livermore, California 94550

October 1980

GENERAL

The ARAC response to the Titan II accident near Damascus, Arkansas on 19 September 1980 entailed 12 personnel for periods ranging from 2 to 12 hours. The first call was a "NEST Standby" alert at 0415L (PDT), followed by a request for dispersal calculations at 0615L, personnel callout at 0630L, crude estimates of plausible source term scenarios at 0845-0900L, first model calculations at 1130L and final model calculations at 1500L. While several new firsts were recorded for ARAC, demonstrating expanded capabilities for NEST-type responses, time lines were very long, essential information was very scant to non-existent, and useful communication of final calculations to the accident site impossible. A detailed chronology is found in Appendix A and a list of acronyms and abbreviations is contained in Appendix B.

OVERVIEW

Attached are a series of figures which summarize and depict the events of the day as well as the results of the calculations. Table 1 is a condensed timeline of events as well as a cross reference between ARAC local time (Pacific Daylight Time) and Greenwich Mean Time. Figure 1 lists the available meteorological

DISCLAIMER

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

This report has been reproduced
directly from the best available copy.

Available to DOE and DOE contractors from the
Office of Scientific and Technical Information
P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge, TN 37831
Prices available from (615) 576-8401, FTS 626-8401

Available to the public from the
National Technical Information Service
U.S. Department of Commerce
5285 Port Royal Rd.,
Springfield, VA 22161



TABLE 1. Timelines

PDT (L)	Greenwich (GMT/Z)	Action
18/1700	19/0000	Approximate start of Titan II accident "leak"
18	01	
19	02	
20	03	
21	04	
22	05	
23	06	
19/00	07	
01	08	Approximate Titan II "explosion"
02	09	
03	10	
		LLNL SSA Alerted
04	11	
		ARAC put on "NEST Standby"
05	12	
06	13	DOE/EOC advisory of ARAC involvement JNACC request for "dispersal calculations" ARAC staff callout initiated
07	14	
		AFGWC/SACWX contacts (precise accident time & WX
08	15	ARAC fully staffed — actions started USGS Topography MATHEW/ADPIC Manual Topography Site X 2BPUFF (1000, 70m)
09	16	Brackets of source term
10	17	
11	18	
		First ARAC calculations (2BPUFF)
12	19	
13	20	Second ARAC calculations (2BPUFF)
14	21	
15	22	Third ARAC calculations (ADPIC)
16	23	ARAC termination
17	24	

stations within 200 km of Damascus. Figure 2a, b, and c depict the upper atmosphere conditions at Little Rock, Arkansas approximately 40 km from the accident site about 3-4 hours after the accident. Note the 180° change in wind direction in the lower 1000 metres. This implies that a surface accident pattern would have extended to the southwest while an airborne cloud, such as the full

explosion fireball, would have travelled northeast! Figures 3a and b list the data retrieved from AFGWC by the SDM capability. Figures 4a, b, and c are the manually generated topography and Figs. 5a, b, and c are the USGS generated topography for the same grid (Fig. 5a is the full 200 x 200 km topography with a lower left corner at 35°N latitude and 93°W longitude). The Site "X" geography for the Damascus area was generated from the map (Fig. 6a), and data points (Fig. 6b) to produce the relevant simplistic overlay (Fig. 6c). The 2BPUFF input file is shown in Fig. 7. Figures 8a, b, c, and d are the 2BPUFF calculations for the indicated source heights, normalized to 1 kilogram of source material. Figures 9a, b, c, and d depict the initial (a) and 1 hour x-z (b), y-z (c) and x-y (d) particle plots of the ADPIC calculations for a 276 m cloud stabilization height. Figures 10a and b define the normalized integrated air dose and surface deposition patterns respectively for 1 hour after the accident. Figures 11a and b show the final result of the ADPIC calculations overlaid with the site geography as ready for transmission to the field. Even in these calculations one begins to see the effects of the vertical wind shear on the cloud (Figs. 9b and c) and the elongation of the surface patterns to the northeast and southwest of the accident site.

What follows is intended to be a somewhat critical analysis of various components of the ARAC system and its interfaces on this particular problem. The intent is to identify weak points in the system which should be addressed for improvement.

1. Notification, Communications and Startup

This area involves most of the ARAC interfaces, i.e., LLNL Alert Center/SSA, JNACC and DOE/EOC.

- a. There are many questions about notification for the problem.

Examination of Table 1 reveals the long timelines associated with this

accident. A significant attribute of the ARAC system is its capability to estimate environmental consequences should an incident progress to a point where estimates are necessary. However, to accomplish this service the ARAC center should be notified early on even when it is not clear that a significant problem might develop.

- b. Accident specification — ARAC was woefully lacking in substantive information regarding the nuclear material in this accident. For valid results it is essential that ARAC know: (1) whether the material was dispersed by an HE detonation and by how much; (2) whether there was a fissile; (3) whether it was involved in a fire with the potential for airborne aerosol. Whichever agency EOC gets the first notification of an accident, they must pursue the accident specification problem until a reasonable or probable picture is available and at the very least provide some brackets on the amount of nuclear material, type incident (HE dispersal explosion, fire, etc.) the time of occurrence, and precise location information.
- c. Data flow — Meteorological data at and following the time of an accident is essential for ARAC to make realistic dispersion calculations. The Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) has a very valuable capability to perform a Point Analysis (PA) for all relevant meteorological parameters for any location from its real-time data base. Such a PA was performed shortly after the Titan II accident and sent to the Pentagon, but was unavailable to ARAC. AFGWC did provide other essential meteorological data, as did the SAC Staff Meteorologist and Weather Support Units. For future incidents, arrangements should be made to put LLNL/ARAC as an addressee on Point Analyses done for nuclear accidents (Broken Arrows).
- d. Communication of results and ARAC field deployment — Had an actual dispersal of nuclear material taken place, it appears as if the ARAC

calculations could not have arrived anywhere near the scene to be of use. No provisions were made to provide a contact phone number of a telecopier location near the scene. If ARAC is to continue to respond to such incidents then provisions should be made for communicating assessment results to personnel tasked with determining the health and safety aspects.

We expect that for this incident DOD/USAF had a health physicist-type individual on-scene within a short period after the accident or an EOD individual trained for nuclear explosives problems. This individual could serve as a point of contact for the relay of essential information to and from the ARAC center to the accident site until the DOE weapons team health physicist and/or ARAC representative arrives. It would be beneficial if all DOD nuclear emergency response organizations and in particular, nuclear explosives trained EOD units were made aware of ARAC's existence, capabilities and accessibility. These same organizations could also determine the availability of or acquire Xerox telecopier units for on-scene receipt of ARAC calculations.

- e. Communications and Security — Several problems arose regarding the possibility of transmitting classified information over insecure phone lines (such as the exact location of the missile silo, type and quantity of nuclear material, etc.). The latter was easily handled by courier/runner within LLNL, but the former led to either a security violation by several parties or imprecise location of the source point. Once an accident has occurred, it is important that provisions be made for transmitting precise coordinates of the incident.
- f. The Alert manuals had out-of-date FTS prefixes for JNACC. These numbers should either be made invariant or changes fully distributed in advance.

2. ARAC Center Operation

Initial manning of the ARAC center started at 0515L, followed by a callout of personnel beginning at approximately 0620L and gradual arrival of staff between 0710 and 0800L. After initial in-briefing of the staff regarding the problem, a multi-pronged effort was initiated to bring the center up to speed. One effort started with the preparation of a detailed topographic data file from the USGS tape data base. A second effort started to manually generate a topographic data file using a new ARAC code capability. A third effort was begun to prepare a site "X" data base for the Damascus area so that model calculations could be overlaid with local geography (another new ARAC capability). Due to the uncertainty of the source term prescription and hilly terrain, it was decided to not prepare a "flat earth" calculation with the MATHEW/ADPIC codes but wait for the topographic data. About 0900L it was decided that reasonably bracketing dispersal calculations could be made using 10 ton and 1 pound HE equivalent initial detonation conditions. The 2BPUFF model was activated to prepare these sets of calculations.

- a. Topography generation — this was by far the most tedious and time consuming part of the ARAC response. The manual method proved very taxing but workable (including two false starts, the process took about 5 hours). Standard map overlay templates are being prepared and a row-by-row rather than point-by-point code entry scheme is being developed. These should reduce the manual method to about 3 hours. The USGS tape data base is also plagued with tediousness, less than fully tested codes, and vulnerability to failed tapes. The process took 5½ hours including a rerun due to a code error. This process will be streamlined, all files put on a system archive and preliminarily processed such that a one hour or less response can be achieved. Resources are being allocated ASAP with a projected completion date of 1 February 1981. This process

will also be integrated with the site "X" definition process to assure consistent grid coordinate generation. The final results from the manual topography generation figure (4c) were excellent when compared with the automated system (Fig. 5c) and instill confidence in our capability to handle off-CONUS problems.

- b. Site "X" definition — This new capability also worked well with the end result that we were able to prepare a hand generated geography (Fig. 6c) and later overlay this on the ADPIC contours. However, haste and round-off in generating a reference corner coordinate resulted in a horizontal location error of 5 km to the east for the local roads and towns. Total process time took 1½ hours due to several interruptions, hand generation of geography and missing site "X" system documentation.
- c. Meteorological data collection — Once the exact time of the accident was established (0745L) action was taken to recover meteorological data back to that time. The SDM capability with AFGWC was used effectively although the output format needs improvement. This can be done locally. ARAC needs to explore the possibility of extracting old data directly from the AWN system.
- d. 2BPUFF model — Initial dispersal calculations were provided from this model, although its limitation to provide results within 10 km was a handicap. The very rigid input format (Fig. 7) of this model is highly error prone (as happened for the first attempt at calculations). This model should have its input file changed to free format and its range of application increased to include centerline concentrations from the source point out to 10 km. Improved user documentation is also required.
- e. MATHEW/ADPIC models — The MATHEW calculations were accomplished without a problem. The ADPIC model aborted because of a problem in

generating source particles above the grid domain. This required ½ hour to identify and fix. Prior to this, a problem or limitation on source prescription to the model resulted in blank output.

- f. Plotting code — The contour plotting code could not generate a contour file for the DPR computer because of a coordinate error on the "blank geography" file on the 7600. The generation of "blank geography" for the 7600 codes on a site "X" problem needs to be integrated into the site "X" definition process. A small code will generate a "blank geography" file with only the source coordinates and a site name as input.
- g. Dose conversion factors — This continues to be a tedious process highly subject to human error. A procedures writeup with relevant examples, conversion factors and individual model limitations needs to be developed to insure a more error free system.
- h. Miscellaneous problems — Delay in implementing the RJET User lockout slowed down the USGS topography code debug process. This feature should be implemented on all 7600's at the start of a problem and removed after the operation is running smoothly. A few non-ARAC personnel came to visit the center despite the sign outside. In the future the inner door should be locked to control access. Labeling of ARAC manuals is inconsistent and reference manuals for all models and procedures is incomplete.
- i. An improved checklist or guide for site "X"-type problems should be developed to flag more of the key processes and checkpoints as well as minimizing interruptions of the ARAC center.

SUMMARY

The accident near Damascus, Arkansas pointed out several deficiencies in the ARAC system and its interfaces. In order to provide calculations which can be used for near real-time accident site approach, population evacuation/protection, and cleanup assessment, ARAC must be brought into a problem or potential problem at its first recognition. Pertinent meteorological data in Point Analysis form should be available to ARAC on a priority basis from AFGWC. ARAC topography data generation must be feasible in less than one hour for CONUS accidents/incidents and less than three hours for off-CONUS events. ARAC procedures, models, documentation and training must be improved to absolutely minimize the timeline from first notification to first calculation available for transmission.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The LLNL/ARAC response to this accident was a team effort reflecting directly the capabilities of the current operational staff and many others who have contributed to the development and realization of ARAC as an operational emergency response system for DOE.¹ This work was performed under the auspices of the U. S. Department of Energy by the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48.

REFERENCES

1. Dickerson, M. H. and R. C. Orphan, "Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability," Nuclear Safety, 17(3), May-June 1976.

000000GLH	722356	R=	180	3329N	9059W	GREENVILLE MUNI	MS	1	0	0	40	000000
000000M	723348	R=	101	3500N	9114W	WEST MEMPHIS MUNI	AR	0	0	0	64	001000
000000M1	723400	R=	11	3450N	9216W	NORTH LITTLE ROCK	AR	6	12	12	172	011171
000000LIT	723401	R=	0	3444N	9214W	LITTLE ROCK/ADAMS F	AR	1	0	0	78	001171
000000LRF	723405	R=	22	3455N	9209W	LITTLE ROCK AFB	AR	1	0	0	95	000000
000000ARG	723406	R=	195	3608N	9056W	WALNUT RIDGE MUNI	AR	0	0	0	84	010000
000000JBR	723407	R=	188	3550N	9039W	JONESBORO MUNI	AR	1	0	0	84	000000
000000HOT	723415	R=	84	3429N	9306W	HOT SPRINGS MEM FLD	AR	1	0	0	169	000000
000000PBF	723417	R=	69	3410N	9156W	PINE BLUFF/GRIDER F	AR	1	0	0	65	000000
000000ELD	723419	R=	176	3313N	9248W	EL DORADO/GOODWIN	AR	1	0	0	87	000000
000000HRO	723446	R=	189	3616N	9309W	HARRISON/BOONE CO	AR	1	0	0	422	000000

FIGURE 1.

STATION: 72340

- 11 -

DATE/TIME: 19 12




FIGURE 2a.

STATION: 72340

DATE/TIME: 19 12




FIGURE 2b.

STATION: 72340

DATE/TIME: 19 01 122

HEIGHT (FT, KM)		----- WIND -----		
554	0.169	50 DEG	6 KTS	3.02 M/S
1000	0.305	80 DEG	6 KTS	3.03 M/S
2000	0.610	160 DEG	6 KTS	3.03 M/S
3000	0.914	225 DEG	8 KTS	4.11 M/S
4000	1.219	260 DEG	7 KTS	3.00 M/S
6000	1.829	110 DEG	1 KTS	.51 M/S
7000	2.134	20 DEG	4 KTS	2.05 M/S
8000	2.438	20 DEG	6 KTS	3.03 M/S
9000	2.743	20 DEG	3 KTS	1.54 M/S
12000	3.658	315 DEG	4 KTS	2.05 M/S
14000	4.267	270 DEG	3 KTS	1.54 M/S
16000	4.877	355 DEG	2 KTS	1.02 M/S
20000	6.096	135 DEG	5 KTS	2.57 M/S
25000	7.620	135 DEG	9 KTS	4.62 M/S
28000	8.534	260 DEG	11 KTS	5.65 M/S
30000	9.144	250 DEG	15 KTS	7.71 M/S
35000	10.668	270 DEG	16 KTS	8.23 M/S
41000	12.497	260 DEG	19 KTS	9.77 M/S
44000	13.411	280 DEG	13 KTS	6.63 M/S
50000	15.240	320 DEG	5 KTS	2.57 M/S
53000	16.154	270 DEG	3 KTS	1.54 M/S

FIGURE 2c.

LLLSDM10 SITE LRF
DATA TIME 20SEP19 0800Z, RAN 1524Z

WMO	ICAO	LAT DEG	LOX DEG	SSFSF TWIWI 8DEKT	SFSFS VSPRP WMJMW	SFCSCFC PRETEM DMBC	SSSSS LLLHM 8 W	SFCSCFC DEWAPP C	SFC SNODEP IN
80SEP19	0800Z								
723407	JBR	3550N09039W	20000	6100M	202 16	MMMMM	13MMM		
723405	LRF	3455N09209W	20103	6005M	196 19	MMMMM	16MMM		
723401	LIT	3444N09214W	20203	5645M	194 19	MMMMM	16MMM		
723419	ELD	3313N09248W	70000	6100M	185 23	MMMMM	21MMM		
723446	HRO	3616N09309W	00000	6300M	200 18	MMMMM	17MMM		

add
PPF TT
TATA

LLLSDM11 SITE LRF 0900Z
DATA TIME 20SEP19 0900Z, RAN 1532Z

WMO	ICAO	LAT DEG	LOX DEG	SSFSF TWIWI 8DEKT	SFSFS VSPRP WMJMW	SFCSCFC PRETEM DMBC	SSSSS LLLHM 8 W	SFCSCFC DEWAPP C	SFC SNODEP IN
80SEP19	0900Z								
723407	JBR	3550N09039W	20404	6100M	208 17	MMMMM	14+07		
723405	LRF	3455N09209W	20000	6005M	198 18	MMMMM	15+03		
723401	LIT	3444N09214W	20203	5645M	196 18	MMMMM	14+02		
723419	ELD	3313N09248W	70000	6045M	185 22	MMMMM	21+03		
723446	HRO	3616N09309W	00904	6300M	199 18	MMMMM	18+03		

LLLSDM12 SITE LRF 1000Z
DATA TIME 20SEP19 1000Z, RAN 1533Z

WMO	ICAO	LAT DEG	LOX DEG	SSFSF TWIWI 8DEKT	SFSFS VSPRP WMJMW	SFCSCFC PRETEM DMBC	SSSSS LLLHM 8 W	SFCSCFC DEWAPP C	SFC SNODEP IN
80SEP19	1000Z								
723407	JBR	3550N09039W	20403	6100M	208 16	MMMMM	13MMM		
723405	LRF	3455N09209W	20000	6045M	194 18	MMMMM	14MMM		
				05					
723401	LIT	3444N09214W	20505	5845M	194 18	MMMMM	14MMM		
723419	ELD	3313N09248W	20000	6045M	185 22	MMMMM	20MMM		
723446	HRO	3616N09309W	00000	6300M	198 18	MMMMM	17MMM		

LLLSDM13 SITE LRF 1100Z
DATA TIME 20SEP19 1100Z, RAN 1535Z

WMO	ICAO	LAT DEG	LOX DEG	SSFSF TWIWI 8DEKT	SFSFS VSPRP WMJMW	SFCSCFC PRETEM DMBC	SSSSS LLLHM 8 W	SFCSCFC DEWAPP C	SFC SNODEP IN
80SEP19	1100Z								
723407	JBR	3550N09039W	00000	6100M	208 16	MMMMM	13MMM		
722356	GLH	3329N09039W	00105	6900M	MM 20	MMMMM	15MMM		
723417	PBF	3410N09156W	00000	5605M	MMMMMM	MMMMM	MMMMMM		
723405	LRF	3455N09209W	00000	6100M	196 18	MMMMM	13MMM		
723401	LIT	3444N09214W	20503	5845M	196 18	MMMMM	13MMM		
				05					
723419	ELD	3313N09248W	20000	5845M	189 21	MMMMM	19MMM		
723415	HOT	3429N09306W	20905	6100M	MM 23	MMMMM	13MMM		
723446	HRO	3616N09309W	01207	5645M	200 17	MMMMM	17MMM		

FIGURE 3a.

LLLSDM14 SITE LRF 1200Z
DATA TIME 80SEP19 1200Z, RAN 1537Z

WMO	ICAO	LAT DEG	Lon DEG	SSFSF TWIWI 8DEKT	SFSFS VSPRP WUMUMW	SFCSFC PRETEM DMBC	SSSSS LLLHM 8 W	SFCSFC DEWAPP C	SFC SNODEP IN
80SEP19 1200Z									
723407	JBR	3550	N09039W	00604	5205M	212 16	MMMMM	13+03	
722356	GLH	3329	N09059W	20106	5305M	MMM 19	MMMMM	14MMM	
723417	PBF	3410	N09156W	20000	5605M	MMMMMM	MMMMM	MMMMMM	
723405	LRF	3455	N09209W	21004	6005M	202 18	M0M01	13+03	
723401	LIT	3444	N09214W	20805	5304M 05	199 18	MMMMM	13+03	
723400	1M1	3450	N09216W	10705	61021	196 18	00905	14+03	
723419	ELD	3313	N09243W	20704	3245M 05	193 21	MMMMM	20+03	
723415	HOT	3429	N09306W	81006	6100M	MMM 22	MMMMM	17MMM	
723446	HRO	3616	N09309W	01307	3245M	200 17	MMMMM	17MMM	

LLLSDM15 SITE LRF 1300Z
DATA TIME 80SEP19 1300Z, RAN 1538Z


WMO	ICAO	LAT DEG	Lon DEG	SSFSF TWIWI 8DEKT	SFSFS VSPRP WUMUMW	SFCSFC PRETEM DMBC	SSSSS LLLHM 8 W	SFCSFC DEWAPP C	SFC SNODEP IN
80SEP19 1300Z									
722356	GLH	3329	N09059W	20404	6900M	MMM 21	MMMMM	16MMM	
723417	PBF	3410	N09156W	20000	5605M	MMMMMM	MMMMM	MMMMMM	
723405	LRF	3455	N09209W	00703	6005M	203 18	MMMMM	13MMM	
723401	LIT	3444	N09214W	00505	5804M 05	202 18	MMMMM	14MMM	
723419	ELD	3313	N09243W	20603	3245M 05	197 21	MMMMM	19MMM	
723415	HOT	3429	N09306W	01006	6600M	MMM 22	MMMMM	17MMM	
723446	HRO	3616	N09309W	01407	3245M	204 17	MMMMM	17MMM	

LLLSDM16 SITE LRF 1400Z
DATA TIME 80SEP19 1400Z, RAN 1530Z

WMO	ICAO	LAT DEG	Lon DEG	SSFSF TWIWI 8DEKT	SFSFS VSPRP WUMUMW	SFCSFC PRETEM DMBC	SSSSS LLLHM 8 W	SFCSFC DEWAPP C	SFC SNODEP IN
80SEP19 1400Z									
723407	JBR	3550	N09039W	00204	5205M	216 19	MMMMM	15MMM	
722356	GLH	3329	N09059W	20206	6900M	MMM 24	MMMMM	16MMM	
723417	PBF	3410	N09156W	01303	6005M	196 22	MMMMM	15MMM	
723405	LRF	3455	N09209W	01005	6005M	203 19	MMMMM	14MMM	
723401	LIT	3444	N09214W	00306	5805M 04	202 21	MMMMM	14MMM	
723419	ELD	3313	N09243W	21205	5645M 05	197 23	MMMMM	19MMM	
723415	HOT	3429	N09306W	01207	6100M	MMM 23	MMMMM	16MMM	
723446	HRO	3616	N09309W	01503	4845M	204 18	MMMMM	17MMM	

FIGURE 3b.

MATHEW CELL HEIGHTS



CELL HEIGHT OF TWO-PELW REGIONS PRINTED AT CENTER OF THAT REGION.
 GRID ORIGIN DATA COORDINATES ARE: X= 530.2 KM, Y= 2892.9 KM, Z= 20 METRES.
 MESH INTERVALS ARE: PELX= 1.000 KM, PELY= 1.000 KM, PELZ= 20 METRES.


FIGURE 4b.

100 100	110 100 90	110 100 90 60 70	70 70 70 70 70	70 70 50 90 70	70 50 70 50 50
100 100	110 100 100	70 60	60 60 70 80 70	60 70 80 90 60	60 70 50 40 40
90 90	100 100 100	100 20 70 60 60	50 30 80 70 60	60 50 80 90 60	50 50 40 40 40
110 10 90	100 80 70	60 60 50 50	50 60 50 60 50	50 50 70 70 50	50 50 50 40 40
120 110 100 80	70 60 60 80 60 50	60 70 60 50 50	60 50 50 50 50	60 50 50 50 50	50 50 50 50 50
10 90 90 80 80	60 70 90 70 60	50 50 60 60 60	100 100 70 50 60	50 50 50 50 50	50 50 50 50 50
40 90 80 80 80	60 80 90 70 50	60 60 60 60 100	80 80 80 60 80	80 80 80 80 80	80 80 80 80 80
90 80 80 80 70	80 90 80 80 60	70 60 100 100 100	80 70 70 70 80	80 80 80 80 80	80 80 80 80 80
80 80 70 70 70	80 80 70 60 90	110 100 110 80 80	70 60 60 60 80	90 70 80 80 80	80 80 80 80 80
80 80 70 70 70	60 60 60 70 100	100 100 80 80 70	60 60 70 70 70	10 80 70 70 70	10 80 70 70 70
50 50 50 70 70	60 80 90 90 70	90 70 70 70 60	60 70 80 80 90	80 80 70 70 70	80 80 70 70 70
50 50 70 70 70	70 60 90 80 60	60 60 700 700 600	60 80 80 80 80	80 80 70 70 70	80 70 70 70 70
80 60 70 70 60	60 60 70 60 50	50 60 80 200 600	70 80 70 70 70	80 70 20 70 70	80 70 20 70 70
50 50 50 50 50	50 50 60 50 50	50 600 600 60 700	60 70 60 60 60	70 70 70 70 70	70 70 70 70 70
50 50 50 50 50	50 50 60 60 40	500 500 500 500 500	50 60 50 60 60	50 60 50 60 60	50 60 50 60 60
50 50 50 50 50	60 50 50 60 40	50 60 60 50 50 50 50 60 60 60	60 60 60 60 70	60 60 60 60 70	60 60 60 60 70
50 50 60 70 50	50 50 50 40 50	50 50 50 60 60 60 70 70 70 80	70 70 70 70 80	70 60 50 60 70	70 60 50 60 70
50 50 60 70 60	50 50 50 40 50	40 50 50 60 60 60 70 70 70 70	70 70 70 70 70	70 60 50 60 60	70 60 50 60 60
50 50 60 70 70	50 50 50 40 40	50 50 50 60 50 60 60 60 60 60	60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60	60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60	60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
50 50 50 50 50	50 50 50 50 40	40 40 40 50 50	50 40 40 50 50	50 40 40 50 50	40 40 50 50 60 60
50 50 50 50 50	50 50 50 50 50	50 40 40 40 40	40 40 50 50 40	40 40 50 50 40	40 50 50 60 60
50 50 50 50 50	40 40 40 80 50	80 50 40 40 40	40 50 50 40 70	50 50 50 50 50	50 50 50 50 50
40 40 40 40 40	40 40 40 40 40	50 40 40 50 50	50 50 40 50 40	50 50 40 50 40	40 40 40 40 40
40 40 40 40 40	40 40 40 40 40	40 40 40 40 40	40 40 40 40 40	40 40 40 40 40	40 40 40 40 40

50 = 2
60 = 3
70 = 4
80 = 5
90 = 4
100 = 2

FIGURE 4a.

TOPOGRAPHY CONTOURS



TOPOGRAPHY CONTOUR INTERVAL IS 20. METRES. HIGHEST CONTOUR IS 210.
GRID ORIGIN TTM COORDINATES ARE: X= 530.2 KM, Y= 3892.9 KM, Z= 20 MRL.
MESH INTERVALS ARE: DELX= 1.000 KM, DELY= 1.000 KM, DELZ= 20 METRES.

FRAME 3

FIGURE 4c.





FIGURE 5a.

MATHEW CELL HEIGHTS




CELL HEIGHT OF TWO-CELL REGION PRINTED AT CENTER OF THAT REGION.
 GRID ORIGIN BYN COORDINATES ARE: X= 530.0 KM, Y= 3894.0 KM, Z= 50 MBL.
 RANGE INTERVALS ARE: PELX= 1.000 KM, PELY= 1.000 KM, PELZ= 20 METRES.

FRAME 2

FIGURE 5b.

TOPOGRAPHY CONTOURS

TTN



TOPOGRAPHY CONTOUR INTERVAL IS 20 METRES. MAXIMUM CONTOUR IS 220.
GRID ORIGIN GUN COORDINATES ARE: X= 530.0 KM, Y= 3894.0 KM, Z= 52 METRES.
MESH INTERVALS ARE: DELX= 1.000 KM, DELY= 1.000 KM, DELZ= 20 METRES.

FRAME 3

FIGURE 5c.

SITE LRF

Parameter

Lower Left	3894. 529.
Center	3918.869N 554.696E
Upper Right	3944. 579.

Towns

	<u>UTM North</u>	<u>UTM East</u>
Whip	3918.	553.
Bee Ranch	3921.	559.
Graves	3915.	560.
Southside	3919.	560.
Damascus	3911.	558.
Choctaw	3931.	559.
Center Ridge	3912.	543.
Green	3897.	560.
Austin	3921.	547.
Formosa	3924.	549.

Roads

HWY 9	(3912., 543.) - (3931., 555.)
HWY 65	(3931., 555.) - (3922., 560.) - (3915., 560.) - (3911., 558.) - (3897., 560)
HWY 92	(3912., 543.) - (3916., 552.) - (3919., 552.) - (3922., 560.) - (3932., 575.)
	(3903., 548.) - (3911., 558.)
	(3911., 558.) - (3911., 578.)

FIGURE 6b.




FIGURE 6c.

X = 554.586 , Y = 3918.905

```

1  LRF TITANII PROBLEM, CLD CTR HGT = 70 M
2  UBAR= 3.0   ZTOP= 10000.   RO= 70.   ZO= 70.   JCP= 6
3  INVC= 4     INFP=3         B1= 10000.   B2= 50000.   B3= 100000.
4  KEPLT= 1   VDEP= 1.   DIV= 6.   CRT= -1.   RAINTP= 8000.
5  ZZZZZZZZ
6  01   0.0       0.       70.   100.   1.     2.     1.     1600.  2100.  0.
7  02   24.       0.       70.   200.   1.     2.     1.     1600.  2100.  0.
8  -1
9  01 FISSION PARTICLES           0.00 E 00  1.0   E 00
10 1 FISSION PRODUCTS-PART CLOUD - WHOLE BODY           1.2 E-09
11 2 FISSION PRODUCTS-PART FALLOUT - WHOLE BODY           1.7 E-11
12 3 FISSION PRODUCTS-PART INHALATION -                   0.0
13 4 FISSION PRODUCTS-PART MILK PATH -                   0.0
14 5 FISSION PRODUCTS-PART SOIL ROOT -                   0.0
15 6 FISSION PRODUCTS-PART SEA FOOD - NO INFO            0.0
16 7 FISSION PRODUCTS-PART FRESH WATER F - NO INFO       0.0
17 02 FISSION GAS               0.00 E 00  1.0   E 00
18 1 FISSION PRODUCTS-GAS CLOUD - WHOLE BODY           2.0 E-09
19 2 FISSION PRODUCTS-GAS FALLOUT - WHOLE BODY           0.0
20 3 FISSION PRODUCTS-GAS INHALATION                     0.0
21 4 FISSION PRODUCTS-GAS MILK PATH                     0.0
22 5 FISSION PRODUCTS-GAS SOIL ROOT                     0.0
23 6 FISSION PRODUCTS-GAS SEA FOOD -NO INFO             0.0
24 7 FISSION PRODUCTS-GAS FRESH WATER F -NO INFO        0.0
25 03 STUFF                     2.2 E 09  1.00 E 10
26 1 STUFF CLOUD - WHOLE BODY           0.0
27 2 STUFF FALLOUT - WHOLE BODY           0.0
28 3 STUFF INHALATION -                   1.2 E-08
29 4 STUFF TVC MEAN OF MILK PATH -         0.0
30 5 STUFF SOIL ROOT                     0.0
31 6 STUFF SEA FOOD -NO INFO             0.0
32 7 STUFF FRESH WATER F -NO INFO        0.0
33 08 TOTAL ACTIVITY           0.0 E 00  0.00 E 00  0.00 E 00
34 1 TOTAL ACTIVITY CLOUD - WHOLE BODY           0.0
35 2 TOTAL ACTIVITY FALLOUT - WHOLE BODY           0.0
36 3 TOTAL ACTIVITY INHALATION -                   0.0
37 4 TOTAL ACTIVITY MILK PATH                     0.0
38 5 TOTAL ACTIVITY SOIL ROOT                     0.0
39 6 TOTAL ACTIVITY SEA FOOD -NO INFO             0.0
40 7 TOTAL ACTIVITY FRESH WATER F -NO INFO        0.0
41
2 4 6 8(1)2 4 6 8(2)2 4 6 8(3)2 4 6 8(4)2 4 6 8(5)2 4 6 8(6)2 4 6 8(7)2 4 6 8(
01 0.0       0.       70.   100.   1.     2.     1.     1600.  2100.  0.

```

R m³ / pCi Sec


FIGURE 7.

1 kg Source 1000 m cloud center hgt.

GROUND SURFACE CONC. UNDER CLOUD CENTER

PCI / M³

GROUND SURFACE CONCENTRATION UNDER CLOUD CENTER PCI PER M³



FRAME 10


2 LRF TITANII PROBLEM

TIME - HOURS
FIGURE 8b.

(AVG. WIND SPEED: 14 KM/HR)

SOURCE: 1 KG HGT OF CLOUD CENTER 1000 M

TIME-INTEGRATED INHALATION DOSE - RADS
INHALATION EXPOSURE AT GROUND LEVEL - R ALONG CLOUD CENTER




FRAME 16

1 LRF TITANIUM PROBLEM

DISTANCE DOWNWIND

FIGURE 8a.



1. FIBRION PARTICLES
2. STREPTOCOCCI
3. BACTERIA
4. VIRUS PARTICLES

GROUND SURFACE CONC. UNDER CLOUD CENTER

1 kg source 1000 m cloud center hgt.

FRAME 10

2 LRF TITANII PROBLEM


TIME - HOURS

(AVG. WIND SPEED: 14 KM/Hr)

FIGURE 8b.

SOURCE : 1 kg CLOUD CENTER HGT = 70M

TIME-INTEGRATED INHALATION DOSE - RADS
ALONG CLOUD CENTER LINE



NOTE -
HIGHER DOSES
< 10 KM FROM
SOURCE.
CODE WAS
DESIGNED
FOR HIGHER
CLOUDS THAN
70M; CODE
DOES NOT
CALCULATE
VALUES CLOSER
THAN 10 KM.

FRAME 14


1 LRF TITANII PROBLEM, CLD CTR HGT = 70 M
FIGURE 8c.

SOURCE : 1kg CLOUD CENTER HGT : 70m

SURFACE CONG UNDER CLOUD CENTER

PCI/M³

GROUND SURFACE CONCENTRATION UNDER CLOUD CENTER PCI PER M³




FRAME 10

1

LRZ TITANII PPOBLEN, CLR ETR NET - PB R

FIGURE 8d.


TIME - HRS. (AV. WINDSPEED = 2 M/S
= 7 KM/HR)



FRAME 2

TIME 11:00:00

FIGURE 9a.



FRYME S

FIGURE 9b.




FIGURE 4

FIGURE 9c.




FIGURE 9d

FRAME 6

LES TITRES II POTRENT EN PDS PR

FIGURE 9d.




FIGURE 10a.





FIGURE 10b.



1. INTEGRATED SURFACE AIR-ADPIC
 CURRENT T/D 9/25/80 16:50
 S:S; 9/19/80 8:00 VALID; 9/19/80 9:00

LRF TITAN II PROBLEM 19 SEPTEMBER 1980 MAX= 1.05E-07
 U235 BASED ON 800Z 9/19/80 ISOPLETHS 1.E-07 1.E-08 1.E-09 1.E-10S**2/11**3
 INTEGRATED AT 2.M EXPECTED AT 900Z




FIGURE 11b.

3. GROUND DEPOSITION-ADPIC
 CURRENT T/D 9/25/80 17:08
 S:S: 9/19/80 8:00 VALID: 9/19/80 9:00

LRF TITAN II PROBLEM 19 SEPTEMBER 1980
 U235 BASED ON 800Z 9/19/80 ISOPLETHS 3.E-08 3.E-09 3.E-10 3.E-11S/TMOK2
 DEPOSITION AT 0.M EXPECTED AT 900Z

MAX= 5.46E-08

fig 11b

APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 19/0000-0030Z Start of missile fuel leak.
- 0800Z Missile fuel explosion in silo.
- 1015Z LLNL SSA contacted (Bill Nelson).
- 1118Z ARAC contacted for NEST-type Standby.
- 1202Z Tom Sullivan arrives at Alert Center -- vacant.
- 1210Z Tom Sullivan arrives at ARAC center, located Damascus/Conway
- 1230Z Tom Sullivan ran RAT* for meteorological data around
Damascus.
Found surface, upper air stations.
Terrain -- quite hilly, presenting transport problems.
- 1230Z Tom Sullivan notified Police dispatcher of his presence at ARAC
center, requested he pass fact to Bill Nelson. Dispatcher advised
that Albuquerque had deployed a NEST team.
- 1255Z Fritz Wolff called from DOE/EOC and relayed information
concerning Oak Ridge deployment, negative reports on activity
from USAF, EACT meeting to decide/act on request for
assistance.
- 1315Z Police dispatcher called to relay a request for calculations of
dispersion downwind of the accident site for the Albuquerque
team (deployed). Also provided lat/lon coordinates of
30°24'51"N and 90°23'50"W (which turned out to be bad).
Also learned LLNL first called at 1015 (0315L), home phone
number of Bill Nelson. Tried to contact re bad coordinates --
phone busy.

1320-1340Z Called out four additional ARAC staff members.

1428Z Fritz Wolff called again. DOE supporting/assisting

0800Z = accident time

"still no known radioactivity"

Albuquerque deployment of a team at USAF request

SSA - Bill Chambers (NEST) + Jay Wechsler, Jerry Dummer

He will try to establish a contact and phone number in Arkansas.

Coordinates from Fritz (DOE) good to the nearest minute:

$35^{\circ}24'N$ and $92^{\circ}23'W$

"Plume went several thousand feet in the air"

I requested he seek out source/accident characteristics

Team assembling

1510Z Ira Morrison — called and provided/confirmed the coordinates (to the nearest second)

I requested source/accident characteristics.

1532Z Talked with JNACC again — Bill Sayer

Requested information on the source/accident characteristic.

No answer on explosion vs. fire.

Fireball to 1000-2000 feet or higher in IR at night (personal estimate) also a plume at 200 feet.

No radioactivity on patients, fuel leak in silo then "it went".

EOD at site "Warhead may be recoverable"!

"Stability type B, 10% of oxidizer left, silo flooded, Puff-type release, small residual fire"

"USAF personnel from Pinebluff went within 1000 feet downwind and no activity"

After considerable discussion of possible source terms we decided on calculations for puff with (a) all HE and (b) 10% HE.

1545Z Talked with Walt Nervik about Alert Center knowledge of accident. Reiterated ARAC need for specific source prescription. He suggested using: (a) 10 ton (fuel) contribution (explosive) and (b) all HE.

1600Z Decided to have Ken Peterson/George Greenly prepare 2BPUFF-type calculations while the input topography files were being generated for MATHEW/ADPIC.

1600Z Dan Rodriguez went as courier to Alert Center to get actual source term information

1630Z Dan returned.

1730Z Ken Peterson had first results done but bad values due to DCON format.

1815Z First results done, called JNACC for telecopier number — bad number, always busy. Finally got back to JNACC at 1845Z, they got a new number at approximately 1900Z.

First transmission at 1915Z-1935Z (from 2BPUFF).

1835Z Fritz Wolff relayed "Probably no nuclear source at all" Probably in a "weapon recover phase", may not need or may need ARAC for recovery support.

2030Z Second set of 2BPUFF calculations sent (70m)

2145Z JNACC called Alert center "wind-down" from Dave Foster relayed by Wade Patterson.

I called JNACC/Jack Roeder and he said they were winding down. "Thanks" and that's all for this one.

- 2200Z Finished the MATHEW/ADPIC calculations for a normalized source with 276 m stabilization height and actual topography.
- 2215Z Problem with output file for the ARAC DPR system — could not marry the site "X" geography with the output contours.
- 2300Z ARAC involvement terminated after quick debrief/critique and storage of all computer files.

APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADPIC	Atmospheric Dispersion Particle-in-Cell Model
AFGWC	Air Force Global Weather Central
ARAC	Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability
AWN	Automated Weather Net
DPR	Data Processor
EACT	Emergency Action Coordinating Team
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FTS	Federal TeleCommunications System
HE	High Explosive
IR	Infrared Radiation
JNACC	Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
MATHEW	Mass-Adjusted, Three-Dimensional Wind Field Model
NEST	Nuclear Emergency Search Team
PA	Point Analysis
RAT*	Radius Around Target code
RJET	Remote Job Entry Terminal
SSA	Senior Scientific Advisor
USGS	U. S. Geological Service
UTM	Universal Transverse Mercator Reference System
2BPUFF	An ARAC Large Cloud Dispersion Code